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Abstract
In this paper, I propose a general framework called Epistemic Logic (EL) which captures a full range of
epistemic phenomena, and apply it to the three-valued interpretion of natural language sentences. Further,
I mention the ability which EL implies, i.e. treatment of indexicals, relationship to Data Semantics etc.
1 Epistemic Logic
Epistemic Logic consists of the syntax and semantics of EL with respect to which natural language sentences
are interpreted.
1.1 Syntax of Epistemic Logic
The syntax of Epistemic Logic consists of a normal version of first-order predicate logic with modal operators
`may' and 'must' which is defined as follows:
(1) Vocabulary of EL
i) individual constants: a, b, c,	 E Const.
ii) individual variables: x, y, z, 	 E Var.
iii) j(> 0)-ary predicate symbols: predl E Pred'. (i E	 /(j) is a segment of the set of natural
numbers.)
iv) logical connectives:	 A, V, D, E LC.
v) quantification symbols: V, 2 E Q.
vi) epistemic modal symbols: must, mayE EM.
vii) auxiliary symbols: (, ).
Term = Const U Var is called the set of terms of EL.
Pred = U.Pred3 is called the set of predicate symbols of EL.
Voc = Term. U Pred U LC U Q U EM U {(, )} is called the set of the vocabulary of EL.
Exp = V oc®1 is called the set of expressions of EL.
(2) Formation Rules of EL
Formulas: The set Form of EL is the least set which satisfies the following conditions:
i) If a1 , • • • , aj E Term, predl E Pred3 , then predi(a i , • • • , (xi) E Form.
ii) If 0, x E Form, then (--0), (0 A x), (cb V x), (0 D	 (0	 E Form.
iii) If q E Form, then (Vx0), (3x0) E Form.
iv) If (/) E Form, then (must 0), (may E Form.
VV Exp = (Voc\ {(,)}) U Form is called the set of well-formed expressions of EL.
Auxiliary symbols of formulas are eliminated in obvious cases.
1.2 Semantics of Epistemic Logic
The Semantics of Epistemic Logic consists of the epistemic model which is constructed from extensional
model structures via extensional models.
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1.2.1 Extensional Model Structure
I start from the traditional well-known relational structure for the interpretation of first-order formulas
which is found e.g. in Bridge(1977):
(3) = (A, {RI} iER
 j),JE {Fl}kEK(0,/EL, {cm}mEm)
Here, ki is the i-th j-ary relation, 	 is the k-th l-ary function, and cm is the m-th constant. But to simplify
(3), I omit functions and constants so that (3) looks like as follows:
(4) 2 = (A , {Rji}iEi(od€J)
On the other hand, I complicate (4) by replacing relations with attributes and their extensional functions
for reasons explained in 2, and call it an extensional model structure:
(5) Extensional Model Structure:
MS = (Ind,{Attrniu(i)JEJ,Ext)
Ind: domain, i.e. (non-empty) set of individuals
Attr: the i-th j-ary attribute
Attri def UjEico Attr;j.: set of j-ary attributes
Attr def UjEj Attri : set of attributes
Ent: extensional function
Attr" —0 Rein C Indn (n > 0)
1.2.2 Extensional Model
An extensional model is defined as follows:
(6) Extensional Model:
M = (MS, f)
Here,
MS: extensional model structure in (5)
f (value assignment) is the following partial function:
Const —0 Ind,
Fred" Attrn
1.2.3 Epistemic Model
The Epistemic Model is defined as follows:
(7) Epistemic Model:
931 = Pow(M)\0
Here, M is the set of extensional models with the same domain and set of attributes.
The elements of M are called situations.
1.3 Entity of EL
The set Ent of entities of EL is defined parallel to Exp as follows:
(8) Atomic Entity of EL
i) individuals: a, b, c,	 E Ind.
ii) Par = {a; x E Vai}: set of parameters of EL.
iii) Attr": set of n-ary attributes.
iv) LO = LC: set of logical operators of EL.
v) Quant = Q: set of quantifiers of EL.
vi) epistemic modal operators: must, may E EpMod
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vii) (, ): parentheses.
GInd = Ind U Par is called the set of general individuals of EL.
Attr = Un Attr n : is called the set of attributes.
AEnt = GInd U Attr U LO U Quant U EpMod U {(, )} is called the set of atomic entities of EL.
Ent = AEnt® is called the set of entities of EL.
(9) Infons
The set Inf C Ent of infons of EL is the least set which satisfies the following conditions:
i) t E Inf (f means the 'undefined' infon.)
ii) If t1 ,• • • , to E GInd, Attrli E Attr n , then Attr riz (h. , • • • , tn) E Inf.
iii) If inf1 ,inf2 E Inf, {-1, A, V, D,	 = LO, then (-infi ), (infi A inf2 ), (in fi V tnf2 ), (in fi D
inf2 ),(infi	inf2 ) E Inf .
iv) If in f E Inf , Q E Quant, x E Par, then (Qx in f) E In f.
v) If in f E Inf , epmod E EpMod, then (epmod in f) E Inf .
W Ent = (AEnt 1 {(, )}) U Inf is called the set of well-formed entities of EL.
Parentheses of infons are eliminated in obvious cases.
1.4 Interpretation
Natural language sentences are translated to the corresponding formulas of EL. However, the latter are not
directly interpreted, but translated to the intermediate entity of EL, i.e. infons, which are then interpreted
w.r.t. a situation, and their semantic behaviors are explained.
1.4.1 Interpretation of infons
(10) The truth value s(c,inf) of in f E Inf w.r.t. a situation s and a context situation c is defined as
follows:
i) s(c,inn = 1 <#. for all M E s, M(c,inf) = 1,
ii) s(c,inf) = 0 a for all M E s, M(c,inf) = 0.2
(1 and 0 mean 'true' and 'false' respectively.)
(11)	 7r : Par	 Ind
is called a parameter assignment.
d E Ind, and x E Par. Then,
7r5 = (7r-1{tx,r(x))}) U {(x ,d)} 
is called the (x, d)-variant of 7r.
(12) The truth value M(c,inf) of in f E Inf w.r.t. an extensional model M and a context situation c is
defined as follows:
i) M(c,inf) = 1 4 #) for all r, M(c,7r,inf) = 1,
ii) M(c,inf) = 0 4* for all 7r, M(c, 7r, in f) = 0.
(13) Let M = (MS, f) (MS = (Ind, {Attrzi} iEi(j),JEJ , Ext)) be an extensional model, 7r be a parameter
assignment, and c be a context situation. Then, the function M(c, 7r, .) with the domain WEnt is
defined as follows:
i) a) M(c, 7r, .) r Ind: constant function.
b) M(c, 7r, .) r Par	 7r.
c) M(c, ir, .) r Attr	 Ext.
d) M(c,7r,.) r LO is the function such that, for an arbitrary /o E LO, M(c, 7r, lo) is the correspondig
truth function of lo upon {1, defined in the first-order logic in a familiar manner.
e) M(c, 7r, .) f QuantU EpMod is a function such that V -+ A, 3	 m ust 1-4 A, and may H V.
(A, V are supremum and infimum function respectively.)
ii)	 In the following, in f, in fi ,in f2 E Inf .
M(c, 7r, .) r Inf is the partial function Inf --+ {1, 0} defined as follows:
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a) M(c, 7r, t) is undefined.
b) If t 1 , • • • , tn E GInd, Attr? E Attr n , then
M(c, 7r, AttrNti , • ,tn )) = M(c, 7r, Attr?)(M(c, 7r, t1 ), • • , M(c, 7r, tn)).
c) M(c, 7r, ("in f)) = M(c, 7r, 
-)(M(c, 7r, in f)).
d) M(c, 7r, (inn A inf2 )) = M(c, 7r, in fi )M(c,r, A)M(c,r,inf2)•
e) M(c, 7r, (in fi V inf2 )) = M(c, 7r, in fi )M(c, 7r, V)M(c, inf2).
f) M(c,r, (infi D inf2 )) = M (c, inh)M(c, 7r, D)M(c,
g) M(c, 7r, (in fi
	inf2 )) = M(c, 7r, in fi )M(c, 7r, E-)M(c, in12).
In the following, x E Par.
h) If quant E Quant, then M(c, 7r, quant x in f) = M(c, 7r, quant){M(c, rfi , in f) I d E
0 If epmod E EpMod, then M(c, 7r, epmod in f) = M(c, 7r, epmod){M(c,e, in f) M E c}.
(7r' is an arbitrary parameter assignment.)
In (13iic), if M(c, 7r, in f) is undefined, M(c, 7r, -"inn is also undefined. Likewise for (13iid•i).
c in M(c, 7r, .), s(c,.) etc. is omitted in unnecessary cases.
The interpretation of in f E In f always begins with c(c,inf).
1.4.2 Interpretation of EL formulas
(14)	 Exp Ent
is called the translation function of Exp to Ent w.r.t. M, and defined as follows:
Let a l , • • • , an E Voc. Then,
{ If (I)m(ai), • • • ,(Dm(an) are all defined: (Dm(cti)••• (Dm(an).(DM( a i • • •
an) = otherwise : t
Here,
a) (1) A4- Const = f r Const.
b) 4o m
 
f V ar: the function such that, for an arbitrary x E Var, x H x E Par
c) (1) Af Pred = f j Fred.
d) (D m
 r LC U Q UEMU{(, )}: the function such that, for an arbitrary a E LC U Q U EM U {(, )},
a 1- ► a E LO U Quant U EpMod U {(, )}.
According to the above definition of 4m, elements of W Exp and WEnt correspond to each other as
follows:
WExp WEnt
individual constant individual
individual variable parameter
n-ary predicate symbol n-ary attribute
logical connective  logical operator
quantification symbol quantifier
auxiliary symbol parentheses
formula infon
We represent (1)m(a) with a (a E Const), and (Dm(pred) with pred (pred E Pred). So, the notational
difference between an expression of EL and the corresponding entity is that terms and predicates in the
former are represented in roman characters, whereas the corresponding general individuals and attributes
in the latter are represented in italicized characters. But the former is a string of symbols, the latter is an
semantic entity.
form E Form is interpreted w.r.t. s(c, .), M(c,.) and M(c, 7r, .) as follows:
(16) ia) s(c, form) = 1 a for all M E s, M(c, form) = 1,
ib) s(c, form) = 0 a for all M E s, M(c, form) = 0.
iia) M(c, form) = 1 a for all 7r, M(c, 7r, form) = 1,
iib) M(c, form) = 0 a for all 7r, M(c, 7r, form) = 0.
iiia) M(c, 7r, form) = 1 a M(c,r,(1)m(form)) = 1,
iiib) M (cot, form) = 0 a M(c, 7r, (Pm (form)) = 0.
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(15)
1.4.3	 -notation
(17) Let A be a formula or an infon. Then, M(c, IT, A) = 1, M(c, A) = 1, and s(c, A) = 1 are also
represented by M,7r-KA, MKA, and sKA respectively.
(18) i) Mor156,A 4* It is not the case that M, *ft,
ii) MIOC A q It is not the case that MKA,
iii) sl5e,A ,#) It is not the case that scA.3
c in M(c,.),	 etc. is omitted in unnecessary cases.
1.4.4 Translation of natural language sentences to formulas of EL
For the interpretation of natural language sentences, we only assume an intuitive translation function Tr
which translates natural language sentences to their corresponding formulas of EL. I.e.,
(19) Tr(sent) = form,
(sent is a natural language sentence, and form E Form.)
whose truth value is then determined by c(c,Tr(sent)) w.r.t. the context situation c, i.e. the situation
where sent is uttered.
2 Infon as an Intermediate Entity
The reason for assuming the intermediate entity "attribute" is the following: Let M = ((Ind, Attr, Ext), n
be an extensional model. f represents the rule of an epistemic subject with which semantic entities are
assigned to expressions of EL. But which semantic entities are they? f(predn is an attribute which is then
extensionalized by Ext , but f (a) (a is a term of EL.) is an individual. (1) M (form), i.e. an infon, could
be thought of as the intension of a sentence in the traditional sense. But there are following differences.
First, the semantic correspondence of terms appears as individuals in infons, which represents the (alter-
native) opinion of Kripke(1972), Kaplan(1977,1978,1989) that proper names and indexicals directly denote
individuals without intermediate entities such as intension. Second, attributes Attrl (which correspond to
traditional intensions of predicates) are introduced as undefined elements, and their extensions are one of
their properties induced by Ext. 40 m(form) is an semantic entity written in a general concept language
which can be compared and posessed by different epistemic subjects. So, we could interpret that form
expresses the Kaplanian character, 01)m(form) the Kaplanian content, and Mer, (1)/4(form)) represents
the extension.
f and Ext enables the following distinction:
(20) i) Exti ( fi (red)) = {a, b}
ii) Ext2 (fi (red)) = {c, d}
iii) Exti (f2 (red)) = {c, dI
(20i) is the extension of 'red' in the actual world (Ext i ) by means of the 'correct' linguistic rule fi in a
community. (20ii) is its extension in another world, but the linguistic rule as such is correct. But in (20iii),
the linguistic rule is false. For example, the epistemic subject mistakes 'red' for yellow. And {c, d} could
be the set of yellow things.
Now, consider the following example:
(21) i) John: "I'm going to the party."
ii) Marry (to John): "You are going to the party."
In (21), the character is different between i) and ii):
(22) i) go-to-the-party(I)
ii) go-to-the-party(you)
But the content is the same between them:
(23) i) go-to-the-party(john), 	 351
ii) go-to-the-party(john),
assuming that {Mi } represents John's context situation of (210 with fj (I) = john, and {Mm represents
Marry's context situation of (21ii) with fm (you) = john.
3 Three-valued Interpretation of Natural Language Sentences
3.1 Classification of Three-valuedness
Here, I distinguish the following three types of three-valuedness:
(24) Type I: category error, failure of existence presupposition,
Type II: undefined cases,
Type III: failure of information,
which are exemplified as follows:
(25) i) The capitalism is yellow.
ii) Naomi is XYZ.
iii) It's gold. (In the situation s where it's not certain if it's gold.)
Intuitively, the third truth value 'neutral' appears just in the case that an utterance is interpreted as
neither true nor false. But the meaning of 'false' is not so clear. As to Type I, it should be understood as
the predicate negation, so that the three-valuedness of (25i) w.r.t. M, 7r is formulated as
(26) i) M, r yellow(capitalism)
ii) M, it 156 yellow(capitalism)
Here, we assume
(27) M(ir, yellow) = Ext(yellow) = yellow + c Ind,
M(ir, yellow) = Ext(yellow) = yellow — c Ind,
Ext(yellow) fl Ext(yellow) = (/),
Ind\ (Ext(yellow) U Ext(yellow)) = yellowN,
yellow = yellow,
and call yellow+ , yellow — , yellow N the positive, negative, and neutral domain of yellow respectively. And
the individual capitalism belongs to yellow N so that the truth value 'neutral' is assigned to (25i).
As to (25ii), we assume that PXYZ) is undefined. Then, tkm(XYZ(naomi)) = t. But, according to
(13iia), M(c,r, t) is undefined, i.e. neither true nor false.
As to (25iii), suppose that s = {M1 , M2 } such that (25iii) is true w.r.t. M1 , but it's false w.r.t. M2.
Then,
(28) i) s 156 gold(it),
ii) s 136
And, (25iii) is interpreted as neutral w.r.t. s.
There is a certain difference between the three-valuedness of Type I, II and Type III. The former appears
w.r.t. an extensional model, but. the latter appears w.r.t. a situation. As we see from (10), s(c,inf) is
interpreted in a modal fashion, i.e. in order to determine the truth value of in f w.r.t. s, we must refer
to several extensional models. For this reason, we call the former types of three-valuedness the non-modal
three-valuedness, the latter the modal three-valuedness. But this modality should not be understood in
the traditional modal logical manner, because s(c, in f) is not determined w.r.t. other "possible worlds",
but w.r.t. extensional models in s. So, we call this kind of modality "epistemic modality".
In order to enable an three-valued interpretation, we must a bit modify (10), (12) and (13ii) in the
following manner:
(29) I) To (10) and (12),
iii) Otherwise, s(c, in f) = N (N means 'neutral'.) and
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iii) Otherwise, M (c, in f) = N
are added respectively.
II) (13iia) is altered to	 (c,
	
= N'.
III) (13iib) is altered to:
1) M (c,R Attr?(ti, • • • , tn)) = 1, if M(c,r, Attei )(M(c, ti ), • • • ,M(cor,t„)) = 1.
2) M (cor, Attrr (t i , • • • , t n )) = 0, if M(c,r, Attr i )(M(c, ti ), • • • ,M(c,r,tn)) = 1.
3) M(c,r, Attrr (ti
 , • • • , tn)) = N, otherwise.
IV) An appropriate three-valued interpretation are given to -1, A, V, D,
	 A, V. (See e.g. Prior(1968)
etc.)
Now, we can summarize the above-mentioned three-valued interpretation as follows:
(30) s TP PP in f
PP and TP represents the truth state of Type I, II, and Type III respectively, i.e., TP,PP E {T, T, N, N, F,7}.
T, T, N, N, F, F mean 'true', 'not true', 'neutral', 'not neutral', 'false', 'not false' respectively.
The interpretation of in f which (30) presents is defined in the following manner:
(31) i) M (7r , PP in f) = 1 4#. M(ir, in f) = PP. (I.e., 'neutral' if PP = N, etc.)
ii) M(r, PP in f) = 0 4#. M (r, in f)  PP.
(32) i) sW PP in f a for all M E s, M PP in f .
ii) S1T  PP inf a for some M, it (M E s), M, r 156 PP inf.
iii) s N PP in f a for one M, it (M E s), M,r	 PP in f , and for another Aff	 E s
,71-1 10 PP in f
iv) PP in f a for all M E s, M PP in f, or for all M E s, M 10 PP in f.
v) s F P P in f a for all M E s, M e PP inf.
vi) s-F
 PP in f 4 #) for some M, it (M E s), M, it PP in f .
3.2 Hierachy of Epistemic Modality
But (30) is not the complete form of three-valued interpretation yet. There remains a possibility to
extend its epistemic modal part, which is recognized by the following comparison of (simplified two-valued)
interpretations:
(33) Extensional Model: MI5C	 (— means `false'.)
Situation Semantics: MIO(Th p; 0)
Signed Formula of Hintikka:
Here, we find three kinds of negation: (v), (-, 0, F), and (-0. And this corresponds to the tripartite
distinction of neustic, tropic, and phrastic part of a sentence utterance discussed in Hare(1970) and
Lyons(1977:749pp.). According to them, an utterance of a sentence can be analyzed as follows:
(34) I-say-so[it-is-so[prop]]
And I-say-so part, it-is-so part, and prop part (i.e. the propositional content of the sentence) are called
neustic part, tropic part, and phrastic part respectively. The three kinds of negation are applied to these
respective parts, i.e.:
Hare neustic negation tropic negation phrastic negation
Epistemic Model 10 — -.
Situation Semantics V 0 -,
Signed Formula V F -,
Then the extended form of (30) so as to include the neustic part looks like as follows:
(36) NP(SHTP PP in f)
Here, NP, TP, PP E {T, T, N, N,
	 NP, TP, and PP are truth values of neustic, tropic, and phrastic
part respectively, and S E Pow (Pow(M)).
The neustic part of (36) is interpreted as follows:
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(35)
(37) i) T(S, TP PP inn q for all s E S, sHTP PP in f
ii) T(S, TPPPinf) 4* for some s E S, it is not the case that sWiP PP inf.
iii) N(S, TPPPinf) .:* for one s E S, sWP PP inf, and for another s' E S, it is not the case that
s' TP PP in f .
iv) -g(S, HTPPPinf) a for all s E S, sHT` PPinf, or for all s E S, it is not the case that
sW'PPP inf.
v) F(S, APP in f) 4* for all s E S, it is not the case that sW'P PP in f
vi) F(S, HTP PP in f) 4=> for some s E S, sW'P PP in f
Theoretically, we can further relativize the neustic modality, and construct an . infinite hierarchy of
higher order neustic modalities:
(38) • • • N P2(S N P (SW PPP A)) • • •
(Here, N P2 is analogous to NP, TP, and PP. S = Pow(Pow(Pow(M))).) And this would be the full-
fledged form of three-valued interpretation of natural language sentences. But linguistically, I believe that
it's enough with the epistemic modalities up to neustic part.
3.3 Contraction of Neustic and Phrastic Part to Two-valuedness
In (30), the three-valuedness proper to EL is the tropic part, i.e. the three-valuedness caused by epictemic
modality. So, we focus on the tropic three-valuedness, omit higher-order neustic parts, and contract the
neustic and phrastic part to two-valued interpretation. But then, the tree-valued interpretation of the
tropic part is expressed using neustic and phrastic negation as follows:
The phrastic part is contracted to two-valued form as follows. First, we treat the neutral case in Type
I and II in (29) as false. Next, we omit the phrastic N_, N, identify T, F and F, T on the right hand side
of (31) with 1 and 0 respectively, further, T, F and F, T on the left hand side with c (empty string) and
respectively. Then we can totally eliminate the phrastic part.
The two-valued interpretation of neustic part consists of (37i,ii). Further, we assume that S = {s}.
Then (37i) and ii) amount to
(39) i) T(S, TPin f) q s TPinf ,
and
ii) T(S,W'Pinf) q slOTPinf.
respectively. I.e., the neustic T and T are identified with 	 and 15A respectively.
But then, considering (18), (32) and the two-valuedness of M(ir, in f), the interpretation of infons is
expressed using	 be and without tropic part as follows:
(40) i) sIT A: s=A
ii) A: *A
iii) s N A: sl5A A and s10--,A
iv) s N A: sA or
v) sHF A:
vi) s F A: si5A--, A
3.4 Data Semantic Modality and Epistemic Logic
In (25iii) and (28), we could neither say that it was gold, nor it wasn't gold. Here, let s = c for simplicity.
Then, according to the definition in 1.4.1, we certainly say that
(41)	 It may be gold,
w.r.t. s. Further, we can say that
(42) He must be a honest guy.
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M = sit(in f V -,in f
PI (in f V	 f)
sit(in f)	 f)
P I (in f)	 PI( an f)
Fig.1
w.r.t. the situation s such that, for every M E s, (42) without 'must' is true. Such 'may' and 'must' reduce
the interpretation to two-valuedness, insofar as in f in epmod in f is defined.
But, as (13.1i) indicates, they do not represent traditional possible world semantic modalities, but
`data semantic' modalities disucussed in Veltman(1981,1985), Landman(1986).
I shortly consider the relationship between Data Semantics and EL.
3.4.1 Disjunctive sentences
In the situation of (25iii), we certainly say
(43) It's gold, or it's not gold.
In general, we can have the following situation:
(44)	 i) s 196 in f ,
ii) s 156	 f ,
iii) s J in f V	 .
But the interpretation of disjunctive sentences poses a problem on Data Semantics. Because, in Data
Semantics, the disjunction is interpreted in the following manner:
(45) s= in f V	 f q s in f or s	 f
But then, in the situation of (44i,ii), (44iii) cannot be the case.
In order to avoid this, Data Semantics assumes that the disjuncitive sentence in the above situation is
interpreted with may. I.e.:
(46) s Ls may(in f V -"inn.
Then (44i,ii) and (46) are all true, because the data semantic 'may' is interpreted in the same manner as
EL. On the other hand, Data Semantics interprets conjunctive sentences as 'in f 1 A in f2 ' without modality.
So, the treatment of disjunctive sentences remains unnatural.
But EL treats this problem in a straightforward manner. I.e., according to (10),
(47) s in f V -.in f	 for all MEs,M in f V -" in f .
Because 'in f V -"in is a logical truth, M	 in f V -"in f for all M E s. So, s	 in f V -"in f . This is an
advantage of constructing a situations out of extensional models.
The whole story is illustrated as Fig.1. Here,
the whole figure represents the lattice structure of
9/t with the top element M . And,
(48) in f E In f, s E 91. Then,
i) sit(in f) = {M EMIM in f}
ii) P I(in f) = {s I s c sit(in f)}
iii) P I (s) = {s' s' 	 s}
sit(in f) is called the situation generated by
inf. PI(inf) and PI(s) are called the
pseudo-ideal generated by in f and s respec-
tively.
P (a) is represented by the triangle with the top
element sit(a) or a. Here, it is the case that
(49) i) 's in f V -.in with Data Semantic 'V' q s E PI (in f) or s E	 f),
i) s in f V -lin f' with Epistemic Logical 'V' 4#. s E PI (in f V -lin f).
The crucial defect of Data Semantics consists in the non-existence of 'disjunctive' situations such as
sit(in f V -"in f) which exist in Epistemic Model that enable the latter to treat disjunctive sentences straight-
forwardly.
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3.4.2 Data Semantic modality and tropic interpretation
Considering (13) and (40), it is clear that
(50) i) s J must in f q sWiinf,
ii) s J may in f q s 7' in f
(Here, we assume that in f is defined.) I.e., 'may' and 'must' tranfer the tropic interpretation to the phrastic
part. In this sense, Data Semanic modality is a kind of tropic modality.
4 Conclusive Remarks
In this paper, I proposed a treatment of three-valuedness in natural language sentences using EL. But,
the present framework of EL is a small portion of its full-fledged form. In this paper, 'may' and 'must'
are always interpreted w.r.t. the context situation. The context situation corresponds to the utterance
situation in Situation Semantics. However, if we want to treat tense, indexicals, belief sentences etc., we
need another index corresponding to described (or focal) situation in Situation Semantics w.r.t. which
`must in f' and 'may in f' are interpreted more naturally.
Further, 'must' does not have the non-monotonicity which is captured by Data Semantics, although
'may' has it in the present framework too. In order to capture the non-monotonicity, we must introduce
e.g. 'background of speech' (Germ.: Redehintergrund, see Kratzer(1978)).
But they do not mean defects of EL, but are all solved in an extended version of it.
Notes
1 Generally, A* represents the set of non-empty concatenation of elements of A.
2 A similar interpretation w.r.t. a situation is found in Fagin et a1.(1995). But they apply it to the interpretation
of the knowledge operator 'K'.
3 According to the present definition, 21 56 Q3 means Not(2 93). So, s ki in f does not mean that, for all M E s,
M 10 in f , which is normally the case in elementary logic books. Likewise for M inf etc.
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